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THE HARDENED STACK / Chapter 7

Microsoft 365 and Entra ID Security

For most small and mid-size organisations, the Microsoft 365 and Entra ID tenant holds the mail, the files and the identities that unlock everything else. This chapter shows which built-in controls to switch on first, and how to do it without locking yourself out.

This page summarises the chapter. The full text is in the book.

Secure Score as a map, not a grade

Hana Sato finds Meridian's Secure Score at 41 percent, and the book treats that number as a list of unopened doors rather than a verdict. The tenant is both the crown jewels and the control plane, and most of the improvements are configuration of controls the organisation already owns. Readers on Google Workspace are told to follow the same order with Google's equivalents.

Secure Score in the Defender portal ranks recommended controls by points and user impact. The author suggests sorting the list into identity, Defender and Exchange, and data and device controls, working from the highest risk down and noting anything deliberately skipped. Points reward enabling a control, not enabling it well, so the real test is whether a stolen password alone could open the CEO's mailbox. A short monthly review with planned actions keeps the backlog visible.

Conditional access and MFA

Conditional access is described as the most important feature in Entra ID: a policy engine that decides, for each sign-in, whether to allow, block or require an extra check such as MFA. The recommended baseline is a few single-purpose, clearly named policies: MFA for all users, MFA for admin roles, a block on legacy authentication, compliant devices for sensitive apps, and MFA or a block for risky sign-ins. Policies should be exported to JSON and kept in version control, break-glass accounts excluded, and every policy run in report-only mode before it is enforced. Exceptions belong in named groups with a recorded reason and review date.

Not all second factors are equal. SMS codes are better than nothing but can be intercepted or handed to a fake page; authenticator apps with number matching defeat MFA-fatigue prompts; FIDO2 keys, passkeys and Windows Hello for Business are phishing-resistant. The book suggests app-based MFA for everyone now and phishing-resistant methods first for administrators, finance and executives. It also flags two weak points: MFA registration, which should only happen from trusted conditions, and the help-desk reset path, which needs a fixed identity-verification procedure. At Meridian, Aiko started with seven people, each registering two FIDO2 keys, before any company-wide rollout.

Blocking legacy authentication

Older protocols such as basic authentication over IMAP, POP3 and SMTP AUTH cannot present an MFA challenge, so they quietly bypass every MFA policy. The safe order is to query sign-in logs for legacy clients, migrate what you find (often a service mailbox, a scanner or a finance tool), then block legacy clients with a conditional-access policy. As a second layer, disable the protocols in Exchange Online, for example turning off SMTP AUTH per mailbox.

Admin roles, PIM and break-glass accounts

Administrators should be few and narrowly scoped, with only a handful of permanent Global Administrators. Privileged Identity Management makes people eligible for a role rather than holding it permanently; they activate it for a limited time with a justification, leaving an audit trail. Two or more break-glass accounts provide emergency access when conditional access or MFA fails; they are excluded from lockout-prone policies, so they need long random passwords stored securely, no routine use and an alert on every sign-in.

The book also recommends separate, cloud-only admin accounts with no mailbox, distinct from the accounts people use to read mail and browse, plus quarterly reviews of role membership. An expert section warns that turning on custom conditional access disables Security Defaults, that guest accounts may not behave as expected under all-user policies, and that stolen session tokens bypass MFA entirely, which calls for compliant devices, sensible session lifetimes and detections.

Sharing, guests, app consent, Defender and Purview

Two everyday leak paths are over-shared links and over-permissioned OAuth apps. The suggested sharing baseline is authenticated guests, required sign-in and expiring links by default, with anonymous links reserved for specific sites; guest accounts should be reviewed like staff offboarding. User consent should be limited to low-risk permissions, with sensitive requests routed to an admin, and existing grants reviewed regularly. At Meridian, a review found a forgotten PDF tool that a departed contractor had approved, still able to read the mail and files of nine users including the CFO.

Defender for Office 365 (Safe Links, Safe Attachments, anti-phishing) is largely set-and-forget, while Purview DLP should start in notify-and-audit mode before blocking. Several features need Entra ID P1 or P2, but the highest-value controls here cost only time.

KEY POINTS

Key points

  • Open Secure Score, filter to identity, and act on the top five recommendations this week.
  • Confirm an enabled policy requires MFA for all users and another requires phishing-resistant MFA for admins.
  • Find legacy-auth sign-ins, migrate them, then block legacy authentication and disable unused SMTP AUTH.
  • Move all but a tiny core of Global Administrators to PIM-eligible roles and create two alerted break-glass accounts.
  • Require sign-in and expiring links for external sharing by default, and schedule a guest review.
  • Restrict user app consent to low-risk permissions and review existing OAuth grants.

QUESTIONS

Common questions

How should I set up conditional access in Entra ID?
Start with a small set of single-purpose, clearly named policies: MFA for all users, MFA for admin roles, a block on legacy authentication, compliant devices for sensitive apps, and MFA or a block for risky sign-ins. Exclude break-glass accounts from any policy that could lock everyone out, and run each policy in report-only mode before enforcing it. Export the policies to JSON and keep them in version control so changes are visible and reversible.
Is SMS-based MFA good enough for Microsoft 365?
SMS codes are far better than no second factor, but they can be intercepted or typed into a fake login page. The Hardened Stack recommends authenticator-app MFA with number matching for everyone, which defeats repeated push-prompt attacks, and phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO2 keys, passkeys or Windows Hello for Business for administrators, finance and executives first. SMS should be on a planned retirement path rather than treated as the finish line.
Why does legacy authentication need to be blocked in Microsoft 365?
Legacy protocols such as basic authentication over IMAP, POP3 and SMTP AUTH send only a username and password and cannot present an MFA challenge, so they bypass every MFA policy. Before blocking, query the sign-in logs to find which mailboxes, scanners or tools still use them and migrate those. Then block legacy clients with conditional access and disable the protocols in Exchange Online as a second layer.
What are break-glass accounts and how should they be protected?
Break-glass accounts are two or more emergency Global Administrator accounts used only if conditional access or MFA fails and locks everyone out. Because they are excluded from the policies that could cause that lockout, they need other protection: a very long random password stored securely, no mailbox, no routine use, and an alert that fires whenever either account signs in.
What is illicit consent and how do I prevent it?
Illicit consent happens when a user approves a third-party app that then keeps ongoing access to their mail, files or calendar, which an attacker can abuse without needing the password or MFA. Prevent it by restricting user consent to low-risk permissions and sending anything sensitive to an admin-approval workflow. Review existing OAuth grants regularly and revoke apps that are unrecognised or over-permissioned.