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THE HUMAN FIREWALL / Chapter 3

When the "CEO" Emails You: Business Email Compromise

Business email compromise is a scam that borrows the trust you have in a leader or colleague to get you to move money. This chapter explains why it carries none of the usual phishing tells, and how one verification habit backed by approval procedures takes it apart.

This page summarises the chapter. The full text is in the book.

What business email compromise is

At 4:40 on a Friday, Rosa receives an email that appears to come from the CFO, David Chen. He is about to board a flight, is closing a confidential acquisition and needs £48,500 sent to a new account before the banks close, without involving the wider team. The tone and signature are his. This is business email compromise (BEC), often called CEO fraud, and it is costly precisely because it does not look like a scam.

The attacker either impersonates a trusted person with a lookalike address or has taken over that person's real mailbox. Either way there is often no link, no attachment and no bad spelling, only a reasonable-sounding request. Attackers may watch for days first, learning names, suppliers and travel plans from public posts, out-of-office replies or a hacked inbox. Because there is nothing for a filter to catch, the defence rests on the person reading the email and the procedures around them.

Why it works: authority, urgency and secrecy

BEC pulls three levers. Authority makes it feel rude to ask a senior person to prove who they are. Urgency, such as before the flight or before the banks close, leaves no time to check. Secrecy, "keep this between us", removes the one step that would expose the scam immediately: asking your own manager. Legitimate business, even confidential business, almost never needs a junior person to move money while avoiding their manager.

A quieter fourth lever is flattery: "you're always so reliable, I'm counting on you." Someone who has just been praised does not want to disappoint by slowing down. Each lever switches off one natural defence, which is why BEC fools conscientious people. The author's advice is to treat the feeling of all three pressing at once as the signal to stop.

The habit that takes it apart

The core habit is to verify any payment or change to payment details through a second, known channel before acting, and to rely on the organisation's approval procedures rather than deciding alone. Do not reply to the email, because the attacker is on the other end. Call the person on a number you already have from the directory or your contacts, never one supplied in the message. If a request came by phone, hang up and call back.

The author is honest that this is strong risk reduction, not a guarantee: a known number can be outdated, a phone can be diverted and a trusted account can itself be compromised. That is why it should be layered with dual approval, separation of duties and checking new bank details against records you already hold. In the chapter's story, Rosa calls David's mobile from the directory, he says he never sent the email, and she reports it. Three colleagues had received versions; none paid, and the second-approver rule held.

The gift-card and hacked-colleague versions

In the gift-card version, the "boss" asks a junior or new member of staff to buy several gift cards for a client and send the codes, promising reimbursement. No genuine manager handles business expenses this way, and gift-card codes are hard to trace and impossible to claw back, so the request is almost always a scam. Verify on a known channel and report it so colleagues are warned.

In the account-takeover version, the attacker is inside a colleague's real mailbox and may continue a real conversation, for example about a genuine invoice, with only the bank details changed. Checking the sender address cannot help here because it is genuine. That is why the habit is tied to the request, not the sender: anything asking you to pay something new or change where money goes is verified through a known channel and passed through the approval process.

Staying calm and making it normal

The goal is not suspicion of every email from your manager. The author compares verification to checking your mirrors before changing lanes: one small reflex at one specific moment, so the rest of the drive can be relaxed. Teams do best when they agree in advance that confirming money requests is simply how things are done, and when leaders such as finance manager Paul say openly that they want to be checked.

Combined with fixed procedures like dual approval and a standing rule for new bank details, this culture means the defence no longer depends on one person catching every trick. If a payment does slip through, report it immediately and without shame. A fast call to the bank and the security lead can sometimes stop or recall a transfer that has only just left; silence guarantees the loss.

KEY POINTS

Key points

  • Verify every payment or change to payment details through a channel the request did not arrive on, however senior the sender seems.
  • Call back on a number from the company directory or your contacts, never a number or reply route the message provides.
  • Follow dual approval and separation of duties, and confirm new bank details against records you already hold.
  • Treat requests to hurry and keep quiet as reasons to check, not reasons to skip checking.
  • Refuse any request to buy gift cards and send the codes, then verify and report it.
  • Report every attempt, including ones you caught, so colleagues who received the same message are warned.

QUESTIONS

Common questions

What is business email compromise (BEC)?
BEC is a scam in which an attacker pretends to be a trusted leader, colleague, supplier or lawyer to persuade you to send money or change payment details. They either use a lookalike email address or have taken over the person's real account. It often has no link, attachment or spelling mistakes, so it does not look like ordinary phishing.
How do I verify a payment request that appears to come from my CEO or CFO?
Do not reply to the email. Call the person on a number you already have, such as one from the company directory or your saved contacts, and confirm the request. Then follow your organisation's approval procedures, such as a second approver, so the decision does not rest on you alone.
Is calling back always enough to stop BEC?
It defeats the great majority of attacks, but the chapter says it is not a perfect guarantee. A known number can be out of date, a phone can be diverted, and a trusted account or directory entry can itself be compromised. That is why it should be backed by dual approval, separation of duties and checking new bank details against records you already hold.
My manager emailed asking me to buy gift cards and send the codes. Is it a scam?
Almost certainly. No genuine manager pays for business gifts by asking staff to buy cards and send the codes, and gift-card codes cannot be recovered once they are gone. Do not buy anything; confirm with your manager on a known number and report the message so colleagues are warned.
What if the email really comes from my colleague's genuine address?
The account may have been taken over, so the sender address alone cannot be trusted. Judge the request instead: if it asks you to pay something new or change where money goes, call the colleague on a number you already have and put the change through your normal approval process.
What should I do if a fraudulent payment has already been sent?
Report it immediately to your manager, your security lead and the bank, without waiting or feeling ashamed. Minutes matter, because a fast call can sometimes stop or recall a transfer that has only just left. Staying silent is the one response that guarantees the money is lost.