Why the people who pay the bills are a target
At 9:14 on a Tuesday, Rosa receives a calm, ordinary email from a packaging supplier Meridian has paid for years, quoting a real invoice number and asking her to send future payments to a new account. Updating supplier bank details is one of the most routine jobs in accounts payable, and that is exactly where a great deal of money disappears.
Finance staff are targeted because of their access, not any personal failing: they can pay, add suppliers and change where money goes. Fraud hides inside the ordinary, and busy, repetitive work with payment runs and month-end deadlines makes it easy to nudge someone in a rhythm. The good news is that criminals want only a few things: a payment to a new account, a new supplier they control, payment for something never bought, and speed. A few checks aimed at anything that changes where money goes catch nearly all of it.
The bank-detail-change scam
The most common and costly trick is an email that appears to come from an existing supplier, saying its bank account has changed. It is often polite, may include a real invoice number or a genuine-looking invoice, and tends to arrive just before a payment is due. The sender address may be slightly wrong, or the criminal may have broken into the supplier's real mailbox and be writing from the genuine address.
The author asks readers to treat any change of destination, such as a new account number, bank, country or beneficiary name, as the single highest-risk request in their job, because it reroutes every future payment, not just one. Red flags include a change requested by email only, pressure before the next payment run, a claim that the old account is closed, an account in an unexpected name or country, and a message that discourages calling or supplies a new number to confirm.
The call-back rule
When a supplier asks to change bank details, call them on a number you already hold, such as one from the signed contract, a previous genuine invoice or the approved supplier records, never the number in the email. A criminal's own "confirmation line" will happily confirm the fraud. If the change is genuine, the call takes thirty seconds; if not, the supplier says they never sent it and a theft is stopped.
The call-back is strong risk reduction but not a guarantee, because a number can be redirected and a contact's phone or mailbox can be compromised. Use a voice call rather than replying to the same email, speak to a known contact, never let the person who asked for the change be the only one who verifies it, and write down who you called, on what number, when and what they said. The call is not an accusation; real suppliers are glad you checked.
Two sets of eyes: dual approval
No single habit should carry all the weight, so the second pillar is separation of duties: one person prepares a change and a different person independently checks and approves it. This matters most when adding a new supplier or beneficiary, changing an existing supplier's bank details, and making payments above a threshold or unusual in timing or amount. A criminal then has to fool two people, and the second usually looks with fresh eyes.
Criminals sometimes fake both halves, a supplier request and a "manager" approval arriving close together. Approval must therefore mean a real, known colleague genuinely looked, not that a second message saying "approved" appeared. In the chapter's story, Rosa pauses over the supplier email, phones the number from the signed contract, learns the supplier sent nothing, leaves the record unchanged and reports it to the IT service desk and her manager Paul. Being asked to skip the second check just this once is itself a red flag.
Fake invoices, duplicates, overbilling and a calm process
Quieter tricks travel alongside: invoices for goods or services never ordered, the same invoice submitted twice under a slightly different reference, inflated amounts or extra lines, and impatient chasing emails about bills no one can find. The defence is to match every invoice to a real order or delivery, compare the amount with the agreed price, check whether it has already been paid, and ask a known contact for paperwork when something is unclear. An invoice is a request to be checked, not a command.
A safe accounts-payable process feels orderly rather than tense. Fixed rules apply to everyone every time: call-backs for new suppliers and detail changes, a second approver above a threshold, invoice matching, and no check removed because of urgency. Nobody is in trouble for pausing a payment to verify it. If a rule blocks a genuinely urgent payment, raise it so the process can improve, rather than bypassing it, because a rule that bends today is the one a criminal leans on tomorrow.
KEY POINTS
Key points
- Treat any request to change a supplier's bank details as the highest-risk request in your job, and slow down every time.
- Confirm bank-detail changes by calling the number already on file, never the number in the email.
- Require two people for new suppliers, bank-detail changes and large or unusual payments, with a real, independent second check.
- Match every invoice to a real order or delivery, check the amount against what was agreed, and look for duplicates.
- Write down each verification: who you called, on what number, when and what they said.
- If anything feels off, pause and ask your manager or the IT service desk; a delayed payment is easy to fix and a lost one is not.
QUESTIONS
Common questions
- A supplier emailed to say their bank details have changed. What should I do?
- Do not update the record from the email. Call the supplier on a number you already have on file, such as from the signed contract, a previous genuine invoice or your approved supplier records, and confirm the change. Put the change through your dual-approval process and write down who you spoke to, on what number and when.
- Why shouldn't I use the phone number in the supplier's email?
- Everything in the email, including its phone number and signature, is controlled by whoever sent it. If a criminal sent it, their number will simply confirm the fraud. A number you already held before the request is far less likely to be under their control.
- What is dual approval or the four-eyes rule?
- It means one person prepares a payment or change and a different person independently checks and approves it. It is most important for new suppliers, bank-detail changes and large or unusual payments. A criminal then has to fool two people at once, and the approver must be a real, known colleague doing a genuine check, not a second email saying "approved".
- How can I spot a fake or duplicate invoice?
- Match every invoice to a real purchase order or delivery someone can confirm, compare the amount with the agreed price or contract, and check whether you have already paid it. Be wary of small, plausible bills for things nobody ordered, invoices that feel familiar, and impatient chasing emails about bills you have no record of.
- Is the call-back check enough on its own?
- No. The chapter calls it a strong way to reduce risk but not foolproof, because phone numbers can be redirected and a trusted contact's phone or mailbox can be compromised. It should work alongside dual approval, separation of duties and records of each verification.
- What if our payment checks delay a genuinely urgent payment?
- Raise it with your manager so the process can be improved for everyone, rather than quietly bypassing it. The author warns that a rule that bends for a good reason today is the rule a criminal leans on tomorrow, and a delayed payment is easy to fix while a lost one is not.