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THE BOARDROOM FIREWALL / Chapter 12

Ransomware: The Decisions You Will Face

When ransomware stops the business, someone will ask whether the company should simply pay. This chapter explains which ransomware decisions a board can settle calmly in advance, and why doing so is one of the most valuable things it can do.

This page summarises the chapter. The full text is in the book.

What ransomware does to the business

Ransomware is a criminal attack in which intruders lock a company's data and demand payment, usually in cryptocurrency, to unlock it. Most groups now also copy sensitive data first and threaten to publish it, a tactic known as double extortion. The groups operate like businesses and choose targets mainly by opportunity and ability to pay. A company whose every hour of downtime hurts, such as the book's fictional food producer Meridian Foods, is attractive for exactly that reason.

For leaders, the important point is what the attack does to the business rather than to the computers. It halts operations, creates a risk of data exposure with its own notification and legal consequences, absorbs the senior team's attention for days or weeks, and tests the trust of customers, staff, regulators and investors. The ransom is rarely the biggest cost. Downtime, recovery work, outside experts, lost business and legal fees usually cost more, and paying does not remove them.

The factors behind the pay-or-don't-pay decision

Most governments and law-enforcement agencies advise against paying, and leaders should assume any payment will later be examined by regulators, insurers, auditors and possibly the public. The book sets out six factors. The first and most important is whether the company can recover without paying, which is decided mostly before the attack by the quality of its backups.

The others are legality, since sanctions regimes can prohibit payments to certain groups even when the payer did not know who was behind the attack; whether paying will work, since decryption tools can be slow or partial and promises to delete stolen data cannot be verified; what insurance policies and contracts require; the ethical and reputational view the company takes; and how much time there really is, given that ransom deadlines are a pressure tactic. The book stresses that this is general discussion, not legal advice, and that specialist lawyers and law enforcement should be involved before any decision.

Why the decision must be made before the attack

A plan that says the executive team will decide whether to pay has not decided anything; it has postponed the question to the worst possible moment. The book recommends that boards settle four things in calm conditions: a default position on payment and the narrow circumstances in which it might be reconsidered, who has the authority to decide and how they will be reached at night or on a holiday, which advisers will be called and in what order, and what information the decision will require.

In the Meridian story, the board spent two hours agreeing a default of not paying, with joint authority for the CEO and chair, retained legal and incident-response firms, and conditions for any exception. The most valuable outcome was a question from the CFO: if the policy depends on backups, how sure are we of them?

Backups and the realities of recovery

The ability to restore without the criminals' help changes the whole equation. That requires backups kept out of attackers' reach, such as offline or immutable copies that cannot be altered for a set period, and backups proven by actual test restores. A backup that has never been restored is a hope, not a plan.

Leaders also own the business decisions behind recovery: the recovery time objective and recovery point objective for each important system, the patience to wait until the network is clean before restoring, and continuity arrangements for running in a degraded state with paper forms and manual workarounds. When Meridian tested its warehouse system, restoration took four days rather than the assumed one because a supporting component was missing from the backup plan. Fixing that cut it to thirty hours, and when the real attack came the system was among the first restored.

Good preparation and the first days of an incident

Preparation works in three layers: making an attack less likely through basics such as multi-factor authentication, patching and email protection; limiting damage by separating systems, restricting high-level access and monitoring for unusual behaviour; and improving the response through pre-made decisions, tested backups, continuity plans, retained advisers and tabletop exercises. In Meridian's exercise, leaders discovered that every emergency number was stored in email, so they created a printed contact sheet and a separate messaging group at no cost.

When an incident happens, leaders should stay visibly calm, let specialists lead the technical work, never deal with the criminals directly, look after exhausted staff and worried customers, keep a log of decisions from the first hour, and return to the position the board agreed in advance.

KEY POINTS

Key points

  • Write down your board's default position on paying a ransom and review it at least once a year.
  • Name who has authority to decide on payment and make sure they can be reached at three in the morning on a holiday.
  • Keep at least one backup copy out of attackers' reach and run a full restore test of a critical system.
  • Set recovery time and recovery point objectives for key systems as business decisions.
  • Keep emergency contacts for lawyers, incident responders and the insurer somewhere other than company systems.
  • Run a ransomware tabletop exercise with the leadership team and attend it yourself.

QUESTIONS

Common questions

Should a company pay a ransomware ransom?
Most governments and law-enforcement agencies advise against paying, because payments fund criminals and do not guarantee results. The decision depends mainly on whether the company can recover from its own backups, whether payment is legal under sanctions rules, whether the criminals' tools will actually work, what insurance and contracts require, and the company's ethical stance. Specialist legal advice and law-enforcement involvement are essential before any decision.
What should a board decide about ransomware before an attack happens?
A board should agree in advance its default position on paying a ransom, who has authority to make the final decision and how they can be reached at any hour, which legal, incident-response and insurance advisers will be called, and what information the decision will need. Writing these down turns a panicked debate during a crisis into a structured one.
Why are backups so important against ransomware?
Backups are the main way to restore systems without paying criminals. They only help if at least one copy is kept out of attackers' reach, for example offline or immutable, and if the company has proven it can restore from them in a real test. Many companies discover in a crisis that their backups were incomplete or slower to restore than assumed.
What does ransomware actually cost a business?
The ransom itself is rarely the largest cost. Most of the damage comes from operational downtime, recovery work, outside experts, lost business, legal fees, and the customer and regulatory consequences that follow. Recovery commonly takes weeks and a full return to normal can take months, and paying a ransom does not make these costs disappear.
What are RTO and RPO and who should set them?
The recovery time objective (RTO) is how quickly a system must be running again after a disruption, and the recovery point objective (RPO) is how much data, measured in time, the business can afford to lose. They are business decisions rather than technical ones, because they tell the technical team what to protect most carefully and what to restore first.
How should executives behave in the first days of a ransomware attack?
Leaders should stay calm, let specialists run the technical recovery, and never contact the criminals themselves. They should look after exhausted staff and anxious customers, keep a written log of who decided what and when, and return to the payment position the board agreed before the attack.